Local Authority Residential Mortgage Credit: a Source of Non-Market Sub-Prime Homeloans for Low-Income households by Coates, Dermot
Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies 
Est 1998. Published by Social Care Ireland 
Volume 8 Issue 1 
2008-01-01 
Local Authority Residential Mortgage Credit: a Source of Non-
Market Sub-Prime Homeloans for Low-Income households 
Dermot Coates 
The Centre for Housing Research, Dublin, dermot.coates@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/ijass 
Recommended Citation 
Coates, Dermot (2008) "Local Authority Residential Mortgage Credit: a Source of Non-Market Sub-Prime 
Homeloans for Low-Income households," Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 2. 
doi:10.21427/D7MT6B 
Available at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/ijass/vol8/iss1/2 
51
Local authority residential mortgage credit:  
A source of non-market sub-prime homeloans for 
low-income households
Dermot Coates*,
Formerly of The Centre for Housing Research, Dublin
dermot.coates@gmail.com
© Copyright Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies ISSN 1393-7022
Vol. 8(1), 2008, pp. 51-69
Abstract
As the volume of mortgage credit has risen in tandem with house price inflation, the sub-prime 
homeloan sector of this market has begun to expand in order to meet demand from those not 
serviced by the mainstream financial service providers. This article examines the role of local 
authorities in providing residential mortgages and assesses whether those who have traditionally 
borrowed from non-market (or public sector) lenders would be considered to be sub-prime 
borrowers by the private sector. It concludes that, in view of the relatively low average incomes 
of this cohort of borrowers, they represent a higher probability of homeloan default and as a 
consequence, would be subject to a higher cost of credit in the private sector. However, this 
paper highlights the favourable terms offered by local authorities and argues that their failure 
to price according to the risk profile of borrowers exposes the Exchequer to higher – and often 
unquantified – costs in pursuit of promoting home-ownership.
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Introduction
Since the 1990s the twin dynamics of historically low interest rates post-monetary policy 
integration combined with unprecedented house price inflation as supply lagged behind 
demand have combined to drive Irish residential mortgage debt ever higher. Compared to 
most other European Union (EU) member states, Irish homebuyers rely heavily on debt 
financing. Consequently, the Irish housing market has produced high residential mortgages 
relative to GDP at 60 per cent plus compared to the EU25 average of approximately 40 per cent. 
This reflects an emergent pattern in the Anglo-Saxon region of the EU that includes the UK, 
Germany and others (European Capital Markets Institute, 2006).
Throughout 2006, more than 50,000 new homeloans were granted each quarter with new 
borrowing valued at almost €10b. These figures indicate continuing strong growth in demand for 
mortgage products and suggest a mortgage market with an annualised value in excess of €40b. 
Residential child care can do with all the assistance it can get
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This lending brought the total residential mortgage market to €121bn with a growth rate of 26 
per cent (CBFSAI, 2006). However, although the total outstanding mortgage credit has effectively 
doubled within 2 years (see Figure 1), the annual growth has fallen throughout 2006 and by the 
end of the year was at its lowest level since late-2005.
Figure 1: Trend in Outstanding Residential Mortgage Lending, 2004 – 2006 
 Source: Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Monthly Statistics (Various, 2006). 
In Ireland, as in many other countries, the market for residential mortgages is disjointed. The 
traditional lenders enjoy the largest market share but credit is also provided by public bodies and 
by specialist financial institutions other than the mainstream, commercial banks. Similarly, there 
exist more than one category of borrower; these can be classified as prime and sub-prime with the 
mainstream banks generally unwilling to service the latter, higher risk cohort. 
These sub-prime borrowers tend to experience difficulties in accessing mortgage credit from 
traditional lenders for a number of reasons, such as previous credit problems, irregular income 
and recent marital separation amongst others (Irish Mortgage Corporation, 2006). Consequently, 
the projected higher probability of default associated with such borrowers is recognised in the 
pricing structure used by those private sector lenders willing to provide credit to these consumers 
and sub-prime borrowers can expect to pay significantly higher interest rates than their prime 
counterparts. 
It has been estimated that this particular sub-section of the market is valued at €1b (or 2 per 
cent of all new residential mortgages in 2006) although this expected to rise to €4b by 2010. 
This is an emerging market with only one private sector lender providing sub-prime homeloans 
130,000
110,000
90,000
70,000
50,000
30,000
10,000
Jun-04 Dec-04 Jun-05 Dec-05 Jun-06 Dec-06
Residential Mortgage Lending (adjusted)
53
in 2006 although this is projected to expand as the value of the market grows. However, this is 
not the entire picture. Many homebuyers unable to access traditional mortgage products have 
availed of an alternative to the new private sector sub-prime lenders and indeed, have been able 
to do so for many years prior to the entrance of a private sector lender. For many decades, the 
local authority sector has been a source of residential mortgage credit and although it has been 
somewhat displaced by the growth of private sector lending, it is still effectively a ‘lender of last 
resort’ for those who cannot borrow from a commercial bank because their income is insufficient 
but who are deemed by this sector to have a good credit record nonetheless.
It should be noted that those applying for non-market (public sector) mortgage credit share many 
of the characteristics attributed to sub-prime borrowers. Recent research (Shiels et al., 2007) 
undertaken by the Centre for Housing Research found that many homebuyers availing of local 
authority annuity loans were likely to be dependent upon social security benefits as their primary 
source of income and/or to have a household income below the national median. Similarly, these 
homebuyers were also likely to have a high incidence of payment arrears and most importantly, 
were actually required to prove an inability to access mortgage credit from a traditional lender in 
order to avail of a local authority mortgage.
 
This article examines the role of non-market mortgage credit and the relationship of these funds 
to market. The pricing structure of this credit is critically considered and the implications of the 
risk of default for the Exchequer are explored. This analysis is presented in three sections and 
these are as follows: 
Section Two considers the role of the HFA (Housing Finance Agency) and the local authorities in 
the provision of residential mortgage credit to low-income homebuyers. The extent of competition 
and interplay between the public and private sectors is explored in addition to the comparative 
cost of funds.
Section Three considers the similarities between those accessing local authority annuity loans and 
those considered by the private sector to be sub-prime borrowers in order to determine whether 
any – or all – of the former are indeed sub-prime. Consequently, the author examines the balance 
between cost and risk for local authority loans and considers the efficacy of vetting and advisory 
mechanisms in protecting the Exchequer in the absence of financial penalties similar to those used 
by the private sector (e.g. very high interest rates). Finally, 
Section Four sets out the key issues arising from this analysis.
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Provision of Non-Market Homeloans
The local government sector has played a role in the provision of homeloans since 1899 and 
until the 1950’s, these were available to all households (Norris and Winston, 2002). With the 
liberalisation of credit markets, the private sector has increasingly assumed a dominant portion 
in the provision of residential mortgage credit and consequently, restrictions were introduced 
limiting local authority loans to low-income borrowers. By 2005, the share of the mortgage 
market attributable to local authorities had fallen to 0.1 per cent from almost 50 per cent three 
decade before. Local authorities made loans to only 193 borrowers in 2005 (see Table 1) – a 
reduction of 60 per cent over a decade – although this excludes those who purchased under any 
of the affordable housing supports. When these are included, the actual number paid is probably 
closer to approximately 4,000 loans per annum.
Table 1: Trend in Local Authority Mortgages Paid, 2000 – 2005
 New  Other  Total   Share of
 Houses  Houses  Mortgage  Market
Year   N € m
2000 52 61 113 4.7 0.1
2001 71 84 155 10.7 0.1
2002 93 131 224 17.6 0.2
2003 108 10 721 516.4 0.1
2004 134 812 151 6.2 0.1
2005 105 88 193 14.4 0.1
Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (various years). Note: Total volume of loans is exclusive 
of Shared Ownership, Affordable Housing and Tenant Purchase transactions.
The DoEHLG (Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government) determines the 
income eligibility limits and loan maxima for these loans. These are not index-linked but rather, 
they are revised at irregular intervals – just twice in the five-year period 2000-05. In 2004, the 
income limit was raised to €36,800 from €32,000 and €92,000 from €80,000 for single and dual-
income households, respectively. The maximum loan available from a local authority was raised 
from €130,000 to €165,000. This latter change brings the maximum loan value to 60 per cent of 
the average price of a new house compared to 80 per cent in 2000 (see Figure 2). Similarly, these 
changes meant that the average industrial wage equated to almost 80 per cent of the income 
eligibility limit for a single person. However, given that the average disposable income (after taxes 
and social transfers) was almost €50,000 per household at the start of the decade, this implies that 
those on intermediate incomes will exceed this threshold.
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Figure 2: Trends in Local Authority Housing Loan Parameters relative to Prices and 
Incomes, 2000 – 2005 Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government (various years)
Note: Income eligibility limits refer to a single person. 
These loans are financed using funds raised by the Housing Finance Agency (HFA) using a 
government guarantee. The HFA has performed this role for twenty years; prior to 1986 the Office 
of Public Works (OPW) provided the funds for residential mortgages to the local authorities. 
The HFA raises funds from the financial markets in large tranches in order to minimise the 
associated cost of capital and provides the borrowings to the local authorities for housing-related 
purposes, including the provision of residential mortgages. In 2005, a cumulative total of €579m 
was advanced by the HFA, an increase of just 3 per cent in annual lending since 2001 and very 
small in the context of a rapidly expanding market (see Figure 3). Almost all of these funds were 
provided at a variable rate. This has tended to be the most common loan type in recent years as 
the use of fixed rate and index-linked loans has fallen from €100m to €100,000 since 2002.
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Figure 3: Trend in the Value of Loans Advanced to the Local Authorities, 2001-2005 
Source: Housing Finance Agency (2006). 
By 2005, almost €3b in local authority mortgage debt was outstanding. This reveals that the 
non-market sector equates to approximately 3 per cent of total mortgage debt in the State. This 
outstanding credit is repayable to 64 local authorities – implying that 39 housing authorities have 
granted no homeloans for many years – although the extent of lending activity varies significantly 
with Dublin City Council accounting for one quarter of all outstanding debt (see Appendix). 
Furthermore, as Table 2 shows, half of all outstanding loans were of 21 to 30 years duration 
although, at 23 per cent, a significant minority of borrower’s complete repayments within 5 years 
and perhaps this reflects a very low initial LTV (loan-to-value ratio) amongst many buyers.
Table 2: Outstanding Loans by Loan Duration, 2005 
 
Duration Total
 €m %
0-5 years 677 23
6-10 years 138 5
11-15 years 227 8
16-20 years 361 12
21-25 years 984 34
26-30 years 509 18
 2,896 100
Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (various years) and Housing Finance Agency (2006). 
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When the HFA advances funds to the local authorities, the latter add 0.5 per cent for administration 
and servicing costs before making funds available to borrowers. At end-December 2006, mortgage 
credit was available to borrowers at a variable rate of 4.5 per cent, roughly equivalent to a 1 
per cent margin (or 100 basis points) above the ECB rate. This is the same as the margins used 
by commercial banks when lending to prime customers but is significantly lower than the rate 
available to sub-prime customers from specialist banks which is typically 350 basis points or more 
above the ECB rate. The rate available from local authorities has also tended to be quite stable and 
although it broadly mirrored the trend in the ECB rate, the full extent of the fluctuations in the 
latter has not been transmitted to borrowers (see Figure 3). For instance, the ECB rate had moved 
on many occasions throughout 2005 but the local authority variable rate remained stagnant at 
2.95 per cent and, indeed, it was not until the margin between the base rate and rate available to 
borrowers had fallen as low as 0.6 per cent that the rate was raised to 3.25 per cent in early 2006.
Moreover, although the local authorities do not compete directly with the private sector – they 
are prohibited from doing so as public policy promotes that sector as the lender of first resort 
for residential mortgages – the product they provide is quite competitive and tends to undercut 
private lenders by 0.25 per cent for variable rate loans and 0.05 per cent for a 5-year fixed rate 
loan. With regard to variable rate loans, the average in the private sector fell within a range of 
4.35 to 4.78 per cent and as Table 4 shows, this can equate to a saving of €12 to €64 per month to 
local authority customers. Interestingly, mortgage finance is made available by the non-market 
(or public) sector at a competitive rate despite two principal constraints, as follows:
The credit risk for the local authorities is recognised as being potentially higher for a range of 
reasons; these are addressed in the following section, and The HFA does not engage in other forms 
of personal finance. In contrast, private sector lenders operate a business model which allows for 
narrow margins in the mortgage market to be compensated by higher margins elsewhere (e.g. 
credit cards, etc.) in order to attract new custom.
Local authority residential mortgage credit: 
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Table 3: Estimated Comparative Cost of Credit by Sector, 2006 
 
  Private Sector Credit  Public Sector Credit
Interest Rate I € i €
  
  (annual)  (annual)
Upper Level 4.78% 12,686 - -
Lower level 4.35% 12,063 4.25% 11,920
Difference (Saving to LA Borrowers)
Upper Level    -766
Lower level    -143
Note: Costs of repayment calculated on a 30-year standard variable mortgage for €200,000. Mortgage protection and other charges 
excluded. Average variable interest rates in the private sector are as reported to the CBFSAI for November 2006. 
Figure 4: Comparative Movements in Key ECB Rate and Interest Rates from Local 
Authorities to Borrowers, 2001(July)–2007(January)
 Source: Housing Finance Agency (HFA) and European Central Bank (ECB), (Various Years). Note: The HFA does not offer a 
tracker mortgage product.
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Since 1987, local authorities lend only to those who have been refused mortgage credit by the 
private sector and/or those low-income households participating in homeownership support 
schemes (e.g. tenant purchase, affordable housing, etc.) with the exception of those availing of the 
Affordable Housing Initiative (AHI) which can have no direct impact on the General Government 
Finances. In 2004, it was announced that a private sector lender would introduce a mortgage 
product for those purchasers approved by the bank. Prior to this development, mortgage finance 
for affordable housing purchasers (1999 Affordable Housing Scheme and Part V Affordable 
Housing Scheme) had been provided exclusively by the local authority sector. 
This change had the benefit of introducing consumer choice and competition to the affordable 
housing market whilst also allowing this cohort of purchasers secure mortgages in excess of 
the maximum local authority loan limit and ensuring that the AHI would be operational. This 
change has not benefited all those households using these homeownership supports as it does 
not extend to those using the Shared Ownership Scheme. However, the availability of private 
sector credit has not proved popular and to date, only a small proportion of affordable housing 
purchasers have availed of this option (see Table 5) with more than 90 per cent continuing to use 
local authority loans within 18 months of their introduction.
It is important to note that the availability of this form of mortgage credit has been beneficial from 
a social policy perspective. Over and above simply facilitating access to owner-occupation, it is 
possible to argue that it has contributed to the better re-distribution of wealth. Housing has come 
to represent the main source of wealth held by any individual household (Malpass, 2005) and in 
the context of the current house price boom, this is particularly true for Ireland. By making the 
purchase of a home a feasible proposition for many low-income households, these local authority 
loans have enabled them to benefit from the strong capital appreciation of the past decade.
Moreover, although this has been achieved at some cost to the State (see Section 3) there is likely 
no alternative scenario in which the Exchequer would save financially. For example, were the 
State to charge an interest comparable to that of the private sector – or indeed, to abolish these 
loans completely – it is likely that many potential borrowers would de-facto be debarred from 
owner-occupation. Many of these, in turn, would likely fall back on the State provision and it 
is likely, the consequent cost would be even greater. For example, in the absence of this form 
of mortgage credit the volume of applicants for social housing would likely rise with knock-on 
public expenditure under rent supplement (in the interim), the construction and management of 
social housing and the making available of discounts under the Tenant Purchase scheme.
Local authority residential mortgage credit: 
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Table 4: Use of Public and Private Sector Credit among Affordable Purchasers, 2005 
 1999  
 Affordable  Part V Affordable
 Scheme  Scheme
 
  Private   Private 
 Total Credit Total Credit
County Councils
Carlow  0  0 2  0
Clare  0  0  14  14
Cork  98 2  121  1
Donegal  0  0  5  0
Dun Laoghaire- Rathdown  0  0  93  3
Fingal  16  0  198  0
Galway  36  10  11 0
Kerry  0  0  6  0
Kildare  0  0  33  0
Kilkenny  0  0  10  0
Laois  44  0  22  0
Leitrim  0  0  0  0
Limerick 5  0  15  15
Longford  0  0  0  0
Louth  8  6  2  2
Mayo  6  0  53  0
Meath  0  0  17  9
Monaghan  29  0  0  0
North Tipperary  0  0  1  1
Offaly  0  0  13  1
Roscommon  0  0  0  0
Sligo 0  0  0  0
South Dublin  237  0  97  0
South Tipperary  0  0  11  1
Waterford  0  0  41  11
Westmeath  3  0  18  1
Wexford  16  0  24  0
Wicklow  18  0  1  0
City Councils 
Cork  46  32  6  0
Dublin  295  2  138  0
Galway  0  0  1  0
Limerick 0  0  0  0
Waterford 0  0  9  1
Grand Total 857 529 62 60
% 100.0 6.1 100.0 6.2
Source: DoEHLG. Note: Figures for Town Councils are subsumed into the relevant County Councils.
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Local Authority Customers – Sub-prime Borrowers?
The local government sector provided mortgage finance to approximately 4,000 households in 
2005 – in addition to the 193 purchasers referred to in Section 2, there were also 730 Shared 
Ownership transactions and the overwhelming majority of those 3,500 affordable housing and 
tenant purchasers who opted to avail of local authority loans. 
These loans can be made up to 97 per cent of the value of a property subject to a maximum loan 
of €185,000 in 2007. In order to be assessed as eligible, applicants must comply with the following 
criteria:
•   Be able to prove that you cannot get a loan from a bank or building society (some local 
authorities require evidence of more than one refusal)
•  Comply with the income test
•  Be in need of housing
•  Be registered on a local authority housing waiting list
•   Be a local authority tenant or tenant purchaser wishing to return your property to the 
local authority, and
•   Be a tenant in a home provided by a voluntary body wishing to return you property to 
the local authority.
These criteria ensure that there will be a higher potential risk associated with borrowers but this is 
offset by the social policy advantage of promoting both credit and homeownership opportunities. 
The requirement that borrowers be unable to access private sector mortgage finance implies that, 
by definition, they are sub-prime. Recent research conducted by the Irish Mortgage Corporation 
(2006) found that sub-prime customers experience problems in obtaining credit from the 
traditional banks and tend to show the following characteristics:
• Irregular income
• Recently separated
• Previous credit difficulties.
These characteristics are also shared by many of those who have accessed local authority loans 
and moreover, there are similarities in terms of loan delinquency and other factors. Given 
these observations, it is worth noting that customers of the private sector sub-prime market 
pay significantly higher repayments by virtue of their risk profile. For instance, the principal 
incumbent Start – a joint venture between GE Money and IFG Group – achieved 360 basis 
points above the Euribor (ECB) and it is expected that a new entrant will target a margin of 
Local authority residential mortgage credit: 
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300 plus (Davy Research, 2007). By contrast, local authorities do not charge similarly high rates 
– regardless of the risk of default – but take only a margin of 100 basis points, as previously 
mentioned, and thus borrowers save significantly. On the basis of the example in Table 4, a local 
authority customer could pay up to €3,000 or more extra per annum in the private sector.
The associated disadvantage with sub-prime lending is loan arrears and in the worst-case scenario, 
serious delinquency followed by repossession. Serious delinquency has been defined as mortgages 
that are more than 90 days in arrears. The US experience suggests that sub-prime borrowers are 
seven times more likely to be seriously delinquent than their prime counterparts and although 
there are no directly comparable statistics for Ireland, the differential is likely to be comparable. 
For instance, recent research has found that approximately half of all low-income purchasers in 
Ireland (e.g. those availing of local authority mortgage credit) recorded some degree of arrears in 
2003 (Shiels et al, 2007). These rates are far in excess of those of the commercial mortgage lending 
institutions where, for example, 7.2 per cent of mortgages had arrears in 2001 (Irish Mortgage 
and Savings Association, 2002).
In the case of non-market sub-prime borrowers, the incidence of serious delinquency is very 
high, ranging from a fifth to two-fifths of users of the schemes. Figure 4 shows the results for 
borrowers under a selection of schemes in two urban local authorities. The figures for the Tenant 
Purchase and Shared Ownership schemes cited below indicate the level of serious delinquency. 
The research by Shiels et al (2007) noted that those with substantive arrears were likely to have 
initially defaulted on the payment of their mortgage protection insurance before beginning to 
miss mortgage repayments at a later date, followed ultimately by more pronounced non-payment. 
This is consistent with the behaviour of borrowers in the US and Chinloy (1995) notes that default 
is a three stage sequential process consisting of initial delinquency, long-term non-payment and 
ultimate default. However, it remains unclear the extent to which local authorities in Ireland 
pursue the ultimate sanction of repossession.
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Figure 5: Percentage of Participants in the Low-Income Home Purchase Support 
Schemes in Urban Local Authority Areas who Experienced Loan Arrears of Three 
Months or More at end-2003 
 
Source: Shiels, Norris, Coates and Kane (2007).
The incidence of arrears on these types of mortgages has increased in recent years – a review 
conducted by the DoEHLG in the late 1990’s found that almost 20 per cent of loans were in 
arrears but the comparable figure in 2003 was much higher. This change has occurred at a time 
when the underlying demographic composition of those households accessing local authority 
loans has also been changing. Specifically, households are now less likely to be married but rather, 
are more likely to be headed by a single or separated person (see Figures 5) reflecting a further 
comparison with the characteristics of sub-prime borrowers, as outlined earlier. This trend 
applied to all mortgages and particularly those who availed of the Shared Ownership scheme. A 
similar shift was evident for the tenant purchase scheme and the local authority loans scheme, 
but it was less dramatic.
Local authority residential mortgage credit: 
A source of non-market sub-prime homeloans for low-income households
Tenant Purchase
Shared Ownership
Scheme
Three months or greater
0 10 20 30 40 50
44.4
35.1
64 Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies
Figure 6: Change in Marital Status of all Mortgage Borrowers and Participants in the 
Low-Income Home Purchase Support Schemes between 1992/93 and 2002/03
Source: Shiels, Norris, Coates and Kane (2007). Note: The reference to Local Authority Loans excludes those availing of these 
loans under the terms of the other schemes.
Figure 6 indicates that households headed by a separated person were over-represented relative 
to the general populace. This implicit relationship between marital status and the incidence of 
arrears amongst those availing of non-market mortgage credit is again similar to the position 
in the private sector sub-prime market. Moreover, the international research in this field has 
found that the sustainability of owner-occupation among low-income households implies that 
such households are more likely to require two earners and that family break-up will have a 
disproportionately adverse impact upon women (Early and Mulholland, 1995; Malpass, 2005). 
With regard to the latter issue, the majority of separated heads of household in Figure 6 were 
women.
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Figure 7: Proportion of Separated Non-Market Borrowers Compared to the General 
Irish Population, 2002/03
 Source: Shiels, Norris, Coates and Kane (2007).
Given the presence of the income test and the relatively low level at which the thresholds are set, 
the mean income of those who have borrowed from the local authorities tend to be low. This, in 
turn, implies that proportion of income required to service borrowings is likely to be high and 
this raises important questions regarding the sustainability of homeownership as evidenced by 
the extent of loan arrears. Figure 7 shows that the income of those with local authority mortgages 
has tended to lag behind that of all households in the State. This gap has widened over time and 
by 2003, the gross mean weekly income of those local authority tenants purchasing their home 
was only half that of the national average with those using the Shared Ownership and Affordable 
Housing schemes only slightly better-off.
Local authority residential mortgage credit: 
A source of non-market sub-prime homeloans for low-income households
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
2.50
1.70
2.70
4.80
0.40
Local Authority
Loans
Shared Ownership Affordable Housing
Low-income Homebuyers (2003) General Population (2002)
Tenant Purchase
66 Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies
Figure 8: Change in Estimated Gross Mean Weekly Household Income for  
Low-Income Home Purchase Supports and All Households, 1990–2003
Source: Shiels, Norris, Coates and Kane (2007).
On this basis, it is reasonable to conclude that many, though not all, of those availing of local 
authority loans share the same characteristics as sub-prime homebuyers in the private sector – in 
terms of low-income, marital status and the incidence of arrears – and would be considered to 
do so by that sector. However, the non-market sector does not impose higher repayment costs 
to balance the higher risk of arrears and/or default, as is the norm among commercial lenders, 
but rather, makes credit available at a competitive rate. Although this plays a positive role in 
broadening opportunities for homeownership, it does expose the Exchequer to a potential high 
risk of non-repayment with the associated costs, particularly given the fact that local authorities 
are not always proactive in managing arrears with the opportunity cost of such funds foregone 
borne by the State.
It is therefore worth considering the systems in place to minimise the risk of arrears and whether 
these can be effective in protecting the Exchequer. In the first instance, credit counselling is 
available to low-income borrowers and ideally, this should mitigate the risk of non-repayment of 
mortgages. This type of service is common in many countries and in Ireland the Money Advice 
and Budgeting Service (MABS) provide financial advice to those seeking assistance. By 2006, 
almost 11,000 new clients had been seen by MABS and these clients reported €48m outstanding 
in debts to financial institutions including banks and credit unions (DoSFA, 2006). Although 
approximately 21 per cent of MABS clients had mortgages, there are no statistics available on the 
Tenant purchase scheme
Local authority loans
1999 Affordable housing scheme
Mortgage allowance scheme
Shared ownership scheme
all households in the State
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0M
ea
n 
G
ro
ss
 W
ee
kl
y 
In
co
m
e 
in
 f
1990 1992 1994-95 1997 1999-00 2001 2003
67
rate of mortgage default post-counselling and as such, it is difficult to fully assess the effectiveness 
of this service.
Moreover, commercial lenders avail of credit checking facilities in order to minimise the risk of 
default on any mortgages granted. This process involves an examination of the credit history of 
an applicant and a determination on the degree of risk associated with any loan. Ireland does not 
have a compulsory public credit register but since 1963 there has been a private credit bureau. 
This bureau pools information from many lenders over a number of years and the lenders then 
use this system of information sharing on the creditworthiness of their borrowers in order to 
reduce default rates. The type of information shared in Ireland includes arrears, defaults and debt 
exposure (Jappelli and Pagano, 1999).
However, the vetting processes employed by local authorities would seem to be much less 
developed. Several officials in this sector informed the author that the only steps undertaken 
prior to approving a loan were to confirm that household income complied with the income test 
criteria and to check the level and cost of any outstanding loans. Consequently, the process used 
does not generally allow a local authority make an informed decision based upon any gradation 
of risk – notwithstanding the obvious initial refusal of the commercial lender – but rather, they 
can only chose to grant or refuse the application of an eligible household. On this point, the same 
officials informed the author that for this reason the volume of refusals was very low and that the 
balance between applications received and refused was not actively monitored by the DoEHLG.
Conclusions 
The availability of relatively low cost mortgage credit from the local government sector has a 
number of key advantages for both low-income households and public policy generally. These 
loans expand opportunities for credit and homeownership and in doing so, ensure that the 
market is complete with the greatest benefit accruing to those who are unable to use the services 
of traditional lenders.
Local authorities make mortgage finance available to low-income homebuyers and in doing 
so, there is necessarily a trade-off between expanding opportunities for accessing credit at an 
affordable cost against a risk of non-payment of this debt. This paper has set out the case for 
classifying those availing of this type of mortgage finance to be sub-prime, both in terms of income 
and demographic factors but more importantly, taking the incidence of serious delinquency 
and previous mortgage refusals as the benchmark. This cohort can avail of loans from the non-
market sector and can do so at a cost of repayment which is significantly less than that charged 
by specialist lenders in the private sector. Moreover, sub-prime borrowers in the latter sector will 
often use these lenders in the short to medium term in order to repair a poor past credit history 
prior to re-financing with a traditional lender; this option is open to those with local authority 
loans but without the additional cost.
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It is for the purpose of removing this obstacle to ever greater owner-occupation that these loans 
are available but questions must be raised as to whether, in their current format, they are always 
beneficial to mortgagor and mortgagee. The level of repayment difficulties encountered by many 
borrowers implies that a high proportion of mortgages granted are unsustainable and that the 
vetting procedures are insufficient – these do not supply local authority lenders with much 
needed data and as such, represent an imprudent approach to risk and financial management 
of public funds. Given that these loans are apparently intended for those with low incomes but a 
good credit history, it is important that the DoEHLG consider whether the extant combination 
of vetting procedures and credit counselling are sufficient to minimise the risk of arrears and 
achieve overall public policy ends.
Moreover, the current levels of immigration combined with a strong take-up of self-employment 
opportunities would suggest that the demand for sub-prime mortgage finance will increase in the 
future, as these are typically determinants of the need for this type of credit. Given the comparative 
savings available from the non-market sector, this would suggest that demand for local authority 
loans will rise and both the DoEHLG and the HFA should consider the ability of the sector to 
respond accordingly and seek to minimise the potential cost and risk to the Exchequer.
As such, it is possible to set out a number of alternative scenarios from a public policy perspective 
therefore, including:
Were this source of non-market loans to be abolished, it is unlikely there would accrue any saving 
to the Exchequer. In contrast, the loan arrears avoided could well be more than countered by the 
cost to the State in terms of an increased take-up of rent supplement, social housing and other 
supports.
Rather than abolition – or even a higher interest rate – a review of the systems and procedures for 
vetting and approving applications could prove more effective. This would better enable the loans 
to achieve their stated objective whilst ensuring greater value for money. 
The provision of residential mortgage credit by the local authority sector to those unable to access 
private sector alternatives is an important housing policy intervention. However, the systems and 
procedures must be sufficiently robust to protect both the borrower and the Exchequer.
*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the funders or board of management of the Centre for Housing Research.
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